Agenda item
URGENT ITEM - FIRE SAFETY ON THE WHITECROSS ESTATE
Minutes:
Councillor O’Sullivan informed Members
that due to the safety concerns on Whitecross Estate, Peabody had sent representatives
to the meeting to address and respond to questions from the
Committee.
Chief Operating Officer, Ashling Fox,
Director of Technical Compliance and Quality, Tara Agarwal, and
Group Director of Resident Services, Alison Muir introduced
themselves to the Committee.
The following main points were noted in the discussion:
·
Flammable insulation had been identified on Peabody Tower and St
Mary’s Tower. Peabody had implemented ‘waking
watch’ arrangements, however members were concerned about the
conduct of waking watch staff and Peabody’s response to the
fire, including communication with residents and the
council.
·
Peabody had not informed ward councillors of plans to decant
vulnerable residents from their flats and were only made aware of
this issue after receiving calls from concerned
residents.
·
Peabody had written to residents to advise on evacuation plans.
Members were concerned about the effect of Peabody’s letter
on the residents as it would have increased their levels of stress
and anxiety especially as the letter was received around the first
anniversary of the Grenfell Tower Fire. The meeting was also told
that residents were worried as Peabody staff had not been briefed
on the evacuation plans, especially as enquiries resulted in
residents been told to contact either fire officers or their
councillors.
·
The Committee was informed that reassurances about the conduct of
waking watch staff were provided, however subsequent spot checks
undertaken by Councillors Gallagher and Graham revealed that some
staff did not know what they were supposed to be doing, were not
wearing high vis vests, and did not have any form of identification
on them. Members were concerned with the placement of tables and
chairs on landings and in stairwells and escape routes, as this
would create a trip hazard in the case of any fire
outbreak.
·
The Committee was concerned that, despite the fire risk which had
been communicated to residents, no attempt had been made by Peabody
to remove items of furniture and an unhinged door left abandoned in
the building corridors.
·
The Committee heard evidence that the meeting with the residents
convened by Peabody could only be described as inadequate and
disappointing. The Committee commented that sending out invitation
letters should have been backed up with door knocking by Peabody
staff and the use of electronic notice boards. It was also worrying
that the fire service was not present, as this would have provided
some reassurance to residents. It was also concerning that
residents were continuing to hold barbecues in the vicinity of the
buildings.
·
In response to issues raised above, Ashling Fox, the COO of Peabody acknowledged that
the whole issue had not been managed well and apologised on how the
initial and subsequent responses had been handled. The COO advised
Members that, although not an excuse for the way things were
handled, there were issues with the waking watch contractors, and
confirmed that training had now been provided, fire drills had been
carried out, bulk waste items had been removed from the stairwells
and a void property had been made available for staff to take
breaks. Staff had also been informed not to smoke in the vicinity
of the buildings. The COO informed Members that she had met with
the Executive Member for Housing and Development to discuss the
issues, and it was clear that waking watch had not carried out its
responsibilities in a professional way.
·
The COO advised Members that on receipt of the risk assessment
report on 11 June, decisions were taken to immediately place a
waking watch team on site, to decant residents who could not
self-evacuate in reasonable time and for the Neighbourhood Team to
start to undertake Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) with
vulnerable residents.
·
The meeting was advised that, having received advice from its Fire
Risk Assessor confirming that the external insulation contained
combustible polystyrene elements and if ignited would produce fumes
and lead to breathing difficulties for residents, a decision was
taken by Peabody to install fire alarms in the buildings and to use
waking watch staff as a safety measure in the interim. After the
alarms are installed, some waking watch staff will remain to ensure
that the alarms are working and provide assistance to residents if
the need to evacuate arises.
·
Members were informed that, following the Grenfell Tower fire,
Peabody had upgraded its fire safety risk assessment to include not
only the internal and escape routes of the building, but the
envelope of the building also. This is how the combustible
insulation had been discovered.
·
The meeting was advised that Peabody had instructed its letting
team to contact the residents about the situation with a view to
decant vulnerable residents if necessary. In hindsight, Peabody
acknowledged this could have been handled better, and agreed that
the Council should have been informed to provide
assistance.
·
The Committee was advised that Peabody had contacted the local fire
service to share its remedial plans, and the Borough Commander had
been invited to the next residents meeting. Members were informed
that Peabody was consulting with the fire service on a number of
issues and in particular the impact of its remedial measures on
fire fighting.
·
Members were informed that all landlords are expected to notify the
fire brigade of fire safety measures put in place, however
landlords are required to undertake their own risk
assessments.
·
The meeting was informed by the Director of Technical Compliance
that one of the shortcomings of Peabody’s response was,
having organised a fire drill session with the waking watch day
crew, the handover to the night crew was not handled well, hence
the standard of service provided by waking watch staff fell short
of expectations.
·
Remedial works staff were currently on site. Contractors and
specialist consultants were to remove the insulation and replace it
with a fire resistant material. In addition, Members were advised
that a programme of fire safety works was being planned, with plans
to be shared with residents in due course.
·
Councillor Ward informed Members that following the Grenfell Tower
fire last year, the Council identified Braithwaite House as having
ACM3 cladding and immediately took a decision in conjunction with
ward councillors to send letters to residents informing them of the
situation and its immediate plans to put in place fire wardens on
site 24 hours a day so as to reassure residents. This was
subsequently followed up with a residents meeting attended by ward
councillors and the Borough Commander of the fire brigade where
issues were clarified.
·
In addition to the above the Council still felt it essential to
send letters to residents detailing the safety measures that were
to be put in place, with ward councillors visiting the building and
speaking to residents to allay their anxiety. The meeting was
informed that work commenced to remove the cladding on Braithwaite
House with minimal inconvenience to the residents, and this was to
be replaced with non-combustible cladding.
·
Councillor Ward acknowledged that although the situation on the
Whitecross Estate was different from
Braithwaite House, an important lesson to be shared was that
communication with residents must remain paramount on all issues,
and especially in instances of fire safety concerns.
·
Members were concerned that the council was only made aware of the
situation by Peabody’s lettings team contacting council and
requesting property nominations as Peabody was considering where to
decant its residents.
·
The meeting was advised that 81 residents had been identified as
vulnerable and resources had been made available to support them.
In addition, a FAQ letter had been sent to residents clarifying
issues such as banning barbeques around the building.
·
In response to a question, it was advised that Peabody was
reviewing all potential fire risks, including the condition of fire
doors as gas pipes. The Technical Director acknowledged that some
ancillary works had already been identified and the estimated time
for completion of work was approximately 6 months.
·
A member was concerned about Peabody’s relationship with
their contractors. It was suggested that the organisation had not
carried out sufficient due diligence on the waking watch
contractor, with the result that instead of safeguarding residents,
its actions had created additional fire hazards in the
building.
·
The Service Director, Homes and Communities acknowledged that the
Council had experienced similar issues at Braithwaite House and
lessons learnt will be shared with Peabody. The Council recognised
the challenges with waking watch teams and handover briefings
between day and night crew. The Director advised that this was
addressed by the Council by ensuring that the Neighbourhood Service
Manager is fire qualified, briefings with tenants were undertaken
by concierge managers to ensure that the message is controlled, and
all concierge staff had completed fire training.
·
A member reiterated the importance for Peabody to always monitor
both staff and contractors. Spot checks by Councillors confirmed
that training had not been provided, and members noted concerns
that waking watch staff were primarily security staff as opposed to
trained fire wardens.
·
Peabody was to install new fire doors in the properties and
anticipated that this would take around six weeks. A member was
concerned by this, commenting that the timeline was unrealistic. In
response to whether the expenditure incurred would be borne by
tenants, the meeting was informed that works would be completed to
ensure the building was made safe and costs will be solely borne by
Peabody.
·
A member was concerned that Peabody’s website makes no
reference to the current fire issue which further demonstrates its
lack of communication with residents.
·
The Chair was concerned with Peabody’s lack of procedures and
guidelines on handling emergency situations. In response, the
meeting was advised that Peabody has a disaster recovery and
continuity policy in place, however there had been a recent focus
on ACM cladding issues, and the current fire risks on the
Whitecross Estate presented different
challenges. The Technical Director of Compliance acknowledged that
staff training issues would be taken on board, and the organisation
would work with Council officers to learn from their
experiences.
·
With regard to the fitting of wireless smoke alarms in flats, the
meeting was informed that although Peabody was consulting with the
local fire brigade about this issue, this was an interim measure in
conjunction with the use of the waking watch, which would be
removed when the insulation has been removed. Members were advised
that this decision was as a result of changing from a stay put to
simultaneous evacuation strategy.
·
The Technical Compliance Director advised that the wet and dry
risers in both towers had been checked and were working.
·
Members were informed that no residents had been decanted at
present, however Peabody had been in touch with 55 residents who
may need to be moved due to their circumstances.
·
In response to concerns about the lack of resident involvement, the
meeting was informed that Peabody was currently working to
resurrect its resident scrutiny arrangements. This would help to
ensure that residents are regularly informed all issues.
·
Councillor O’Sullivan thanked Peabody representatives for
attending the meeting and proposed an additional meeting to
consider all fire safety issues at the Peabody and St Mary’s
towers, gather evidence from residents, and make recommendations
which would be sent to the Executive Member for Housing and
Development, the Chief Executive of Peabody, and the Homes and
Communities Agency.
RESOLVED:
(i) That an additional meeting be
convened to consider evidence from residents on the Whitecross estate about fire safety;
(ii) That the Executive Member for Housing and Development be asked to share information on how the Council managed fire risks at Braithwaite House with other housing providers in Islington.
Supporting documents: