Agenda item

The Committee considered the Scrutiny Initiation Document and received witness evidence from Damian Dempsey, Group Leader – Quantity Surveyors, and Stuart Fuller, Construction, Fire, and Gas Safety Manager.

The following main points were noted in the discussion:

·         The council’s fire safety works were informed by guidance issued by the Local Government Association following the major fire incidents at Lakanal House in 2009 and Shirley Towers in 2010.

·         Fire safety issues were considered regularly by the Homes and Estates Safety Board, which included representation from housing services and the London Fire Brigade. The Board was independently chaired by the Director of Housing Services at Oxford City Council to provide external oversight.

·         One major aspect of the fire safety improvement works carried out in recent years was the upgrading of existing entrance doors and the installation of certified fire safe doors to each property. Islington Council was responsible for upgrading the doors to tenanted properties, whereas leaseholders were responsible for fitting such doors to their own properties. Fire safe doors were fitted with a self-closing mechanism which helped to contain fires.

·         It was explained that self-closing doors could operate either through self-closing hinges or an overhead device. Doors with self-closing hinges were more aesthetically pleasing than overhead devices, which officers commented could make a property feel ‘institutional’. However, the council preferred to install doors with overhead closing devices as they were more effective than self-closing hinges.

·         Since the Grenfell Tower fire the council had taken a stronger stance on leaseholders who had not yet installed a self-closing door which complied with regulations. The council was contacting leaseholders advising that they needed to either fit their own door or opt-in to the council’s door-fitting scheme within seven days, otherwise the council would seek a court injunction requiring them to fit a compliant door.

·         Officers commented that the Grenfell Tower fire would very likely result in regulatory change, and the council would ensure that it was fully compliant with any new regulations or guidance.

·         Islington Council had three full time fire safety risk assessors. Each housing block was assessed every three years and its level of fire risk rated as either Tolerable, Moderate, or Substantial. The results of this fire risk assessment fed into the capital programme.

·         The council was currently evaluating tenders for the installation of emergency lighting and inter-linked hardwired heat and smoke alarms in street properties and mansion blocks. It was explained that Partners for Improvement in Islington was not responsible for these works as they were outside the scope of the street properties management contract.

·         A member queried if fitting inter-linked heat and smoke alarms was sufficient to ensure the safety of residents in street properties and mansion blocks. Officers advised that the alarms would give residents early warning in the event of a fire and would assist in the prompt evacuation of a property. A member suggested that an early warning may not offer a sufficient level of safety to a vulnerable tenant with mobility issues. Officers commented that these properties were general needs housing and were not built to specifically accommodate disabled and vulnerable people.

·         It was commented that Partners’ tenants were worried, particularly as Partners’ repairs service was managed by Rydon, which had refurbished the Grenfell Tower. It was suggested that Partners’ needed to be more responsive to the concerns of residents, particularly as the Partners’ resident scrutiny forum was now defunct.

·         Officers confirmed that Partners’ attended meetings of the Homes and Estates Safety Board.

·         A member of the Committee provided an example of fire alarms fitted in street properties which were inaccessible to vulnerable and disabled people due to the height of their ceilings. These alarms could only be tested and deactivated manually by using a broomstick or another aid. It was commented that remote-controlled alarms were available and these would be much more suitable for vulnerable and disabled people. It was commented that this had been reported to Partners but no action had been taken.

·         A member of the public queried if the council would be upgrading entry systems on council blocks. Officers were not able to provide specific details of any plans at the meeting. It was commented that the fire brigade was able to override these systems however access to the properties had to be carefully controlled.

·         The Committee requested that the Scrutiny Initiation Document be amended to include: (i) a review of the working relationships between the council’s Emergency Planning team and Local Authority Liaison Officers, and the London Fire Brigade; (ii) a review of how vulnerable residents are incorporated into evacuation plans and how these plans are stored and accessed in the event of an emergency; (iii) a review of the risks posed by takeaways and hazardous materials being located on the ground floor of blocks of flats; and (iv) a review of tenancy conditions related to the storage and use of barbeques and gas canisters.

·         It was suggested that committee members should familiarise themselves with the findings of the Lakanal House Coroner Inquest.

·         It was suggested that the London Hazards Centre and Health and Safety Executive could be invited to submit evidence to the review.

The Committee thanked the officers for their attendance.

RESOLVED:

That the Scrutiny Initiation Document be approved; subject to the following additions:

(i)            a review of the working relationships between the council’s Emergency Planning team and Local Authority Liaison Officers, and the London Fire Brigade;

(ii)           a review of how vulnerable residents are incorporated into evacuation plans and how these plans are stored and accessed in the event of an emergency;

(iii)          a review of the risks posed by takeaways and hazardous materials being located on the ground floor of blocks of flats; and

(iv)          a review of tenancy conditions related to the storage and use of barbeques and gas canisters.